Kim Invites Trump to Meet Again

In that location is probably no other bilateral relationship today where alphabetic character writing between two countries' leaders has played such a dramatic function as that between North korea and the United states of america. The 27 letters exchanged betwixt North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then-U.Due south. President Donald Trump between April 2018 and Baronial 2019—characterized as "beautiful letters" by Trump—independent tactical feints, unctuous flattery, and psychological ploys that accept marked exchanges of leaders of all stripes and stations throughout history. In this instance, they also contained the core perceptions and misperceptions of how each thought to move—and movement the other—from decades of U.S.-North Korean hostility to something budgeted more normal or at to the lowest degree stable relations between their ii vastly different countries.

Of course, the -to-be reconciliation and nuclear disarmament did not come to pass.

There has now been a hiatus in U.Southward.-Democratic people's republic of korea engagement for well-nigh two years, largely at Pyongyang's insistence. Nothing is forever, however, and the ii sides will sooner or later get dorsum to negotiations. Signals will pulse once once again through the usual channels, and the importance of careful, deliberate messages between the two countries' leaders will return to the fore.

In a letter of the alphabet from then-U.Due south. President Donald Trump to Due north Korean leader Kim Jong Un dated May 24, 2018, Trump announces that the Usa is pulling out of its planned summit with North Korea in Singapore. White House

When correspondence between the U.S. president and the Northward Korean leader does start upwards again, it will be of import to understand what has gone through that channel before and how it afflicted the outcome of diplomacy. With access to the full file of letters that Bob Woodward excerpted in his book nigh the Trump presidency, Rage, that is what I gear up out to practice. (Woodward, who had access to the original letters while researching his volume, was non permitted to make copies or take photos of them. He read the messages into his record recorder and after transcribed them. Information technology is these transcriptions, most of which take never been published, that are quoted below.)

If the 27 letters exchanged betwixt Trump and Kim have received only scant attention, that'southward due in office to the misconception amongst journalists and pundits that their exchange was nonsubstantive and even risible. When one actually reads them, however, they give the opposite impression. By no means are they uncomplicated love messages. In their totality, they are a highly illuminating reflection of the central misperceptions between the two sides. Every bit a close read makes articulate, it was the messages, perhaps more than any other attribute of diplomacy and statecraft, that set the stage for the train wreck that was the 2019 Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi and the subsequent breakdown of communication.

The first Trump-Kim summit in Singapore in June 2018 had laid out a number of goals: establishing new relations between the two countries and building a "lasting and stable peace regime" on the Korean Peninsula. The joint argument's lofty formulations were essentially starting points from which the ii sides could address long-standing issues. Of key importance to Washington was that Kim committed to "work toward" the "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Through the remainder of 2018 and into 2019, the two leaders kept in touch as they wrestled with how to plow the pledges they made in Singapore into action. From the first letter to Kim later Singapore, Trump focused on denuclearization—no surprise, equally getting North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons has been a primary U.S. goal for decades. What is surprising is that Trump'south letters were all merely silent on what steps the United States was prepared to take in render. Whether that was deliberate or through careless inadvertence, information technology was a mistake. Kim saw information technology and sent alert after warning that the road to denuclearization could only come up through practical, synchronous steps that would also accost North korea's own security concerns. This would remain the heart of the problem: Kim would acknowledge the primal U.Southward. concern of denuclearization, while Trump'due south messages about completely ignored Democratic people's republic of korea's ain essential goals, including a new relationship that would relieve the pressure level—including from economic sanctions—that Kim believed stood in the mode of his plans for the country'due south development.

On July 3, 2018, Trump informed Kim by letter that he was sending U.South. Secretarial assistant of State Mike Pompeo to Pyongyang, emphasizing that "most chiefly," Pompeo was nether his "instructions" to find agreement on "taking the starting time major steps toward the final, fully verified denuclearization of Korean Peninsula." This no doubt fix off warning bells in Pyongyang. Correct from the get-go, without any hint of what Washington might exist prepared to pledge in return, Trump was focusing on denuclearization.

In his respond on July 6, Kim took the high road, expressing the wish that his "trust and confidence" in Trump would be "further strengthened" in the "hereafter process of taking applied actions." With that innocent-sounding phrase, Kim was reminding Trump of the firmly held N Korean position that denuclearization could just happen gradually and in synch with "practical actions" taken by the Usa. Kim made no explicit reference to specific pledges by either side, however, and did not directly claiming Trump's characterization of the importance of denuclearization.

Pompeo's meeting in Pyongyang went badly. Differences over substance and sequence were and so deep that the N Korean foreign ministry—certainly with Kim's approval and probably at his direction—issued a statement immediately subsequently the talks accusing the United States of bringing a "unilateral and brigandish demand for denuclearization" while "putting off to the far back even the consequence of the end of war proclamation, which has already been agreed upon" and "non even mentioning the outcome of building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." An end of war annunciation was an "issue that Trump had shown more than eagerness for fifty-fifty during the [Due north Korea-U.S.] tiptop talks," the statement continued.

A letter from Kim to Trump, in Korean at left and translated to English language at right, dated July 6, 2018. DOUGLAS CURRAN/AFP via Getty Images

At the terminate of July, Kim sent another letter to Trump. It did not repeat the foreign ministry building's charges. Rather, in gingerly fashion, Kim merely noted the "lack of predictable declaration on the termination of war" in the negotiations so far.

Trump replied on Aug. 2, non acknowledging the effect of the announcement just one time again going correct to denuclearization: "Information technology is now time to brand progress on the other commitments nosotros made, including complete denuclearization." Some in the North might accept chewed over the use of "we" while unmistakably referring to only one side's goal.

On Sept. 6, after the sudden counterfoil of a planned second visit by Pompeo, Kim sent his most crucial alphabetic character during the entire exchange. Ignoring who canceled the visit or why, he expresses—with razor-keen clarity—his views on the U.South. secretary of state: "It is my thought that instead of having a war of words on issues that divide our two sides with Secretary Pompeo, who information technology is hard for me to think can fully correspond Your Excellency's mind, it would be more constructive to come across in person with Your Excellency, who [is] endowed with an outstanding political sense, and take an in-depth exchange of views on important issues including the denuclearization."

This might have been meant as an early bespeak that any "in-depth substitution" on the nuclear result would be reserved to direct talks between Kim and Trump. This practise of reserving the most important or sensitive discussions for a face-to-face summit was not unusual. In November 2000 in Kuala Lumpur, the Due north Korean delegation would not talk over the missile issue with its U.S. counterpart, even though the latter had been sent to the Malaysian capital letter for the verbal purpose of resolving as much of that issue as possible in accelerate of any summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and U.S. President Bill Clinton.

In the September letter, Kim says he is prepared to fully implement the Singapore joint statement and that "in add-on to the steps that nosotros have taken up forepart, we are willing to take further meaningful steps one at a fourth dimension in a phased manner, such every bit the complete shutdown of the Nuclear Weapons Plant or the Satellite Launch District and the irreversible closure of the nuclear materials product facility [at Yongbyon]." However, "in order for us to sustain the momentum … nosotros need to experience some changes in our surroundings, even a little, to prove that the effort[s] we make are by no means in vain." At this signal, Kim was telling Trump manifestly what had been a abiding North Korean position ever since the Agreed Framework negotiations in 1993 and 1994: Pyongyang's concessions would have to be modestly veiled by some sort of U.S. motion that could be portrayed every bit addressing North Korean concerns. Kim and so reemphasizes that denuclearization must proceed "on the principle of phased, synchronized action." He goes on: "If our goodwill and sincere efforts are properly appreciated and the United states of america [takes] more noun steps and actions in a phased manner, significant progress will be made in the issue of denuclearization." Here, Kim was telling Trump directly that specific, of import N Korean moves were on the table—and shutting downwards the Nuclear Weapons Institute, an instrumental part of the country'southward nuclear weapons program, would be quite important. These were, however, contingent on unspecified "substantive steps" by Washington. In his subsequent messages, Trump never acknowledges or probes Kim'due south negotiating stance. Nor is there evidence that Kim'due south offering up the Nuclear Weapons Institute fifty-fifty registered in Washington.

At the summit between North and South Korea later in September, Kim echoed to South Korean President Moon Jae-in what he had told Trump in his letter, laying out in detail what Pyongyang was prepared to offer on the nuclear effect, as well as his intense frustration at not seeing a positive response from Washington. Presently after the summit ended, Kim fired off another cannonball to Trump, lament that the "excessive interest President Moon is showing … in our affair is unnecessary." He goes on to say that "many people are skeptical about the current condition and the prospects of the relations between our countries [and] almost our ideas of resolving the consequence of denuclearization in the hereafter. I, together with Your Excellency, will definitely bear witness them incorrect." Here, Kim leaves open whether "many people" refers to those in Washington or in Pyongyang. While information technology may be difficult to believe Kim faced open skepticism in Pyongyang over his initiative toward Washington—or would admit it to the U.S. president if he did—this is a theme that surfaced more than once in Kim's correspondence. Skepticism over the negotiations also appears in diverse forms in the North Korean media throughout this period.

By December, the two sides were seriously discussing the possibility of a second summit, focusing peculiarly on a possible choice of venue given Kim'southward abstention of traveling by air or ocean. Kim sent a bulletin on Dec. 25 to hash out the venue. In the alphabetic character, he says he has "already instructed" his "closest and well-nigh trusted colleagues" to speed up the procedure. He expresses worry that it "may not reverberate positively on us should both sides announced to stubbornly insist on our respective positions" regarding the location. His solution: that the two sides "urgently concur senior-level contact." At get-go glance, this may appear to be a nonsubstantive message dealing with mundane logistical matters, but information technology is actually signaling Kim'due south deep interest in moving to a second peak and not assuasive the process to be delayed or sidetracked.

On Jan. 18, 2019, after a ranking North Korean envoy visited Washington to hash out the upcoming second summit in Hanoi, Trump wrote a brief annotation to Kim: "A neat meeting and message. I will meet y'all presently." Incredibly, Trump closes with "Your friend." Trump'southward side by side note, on Feb. nineteen, only days before the Hanoi meeting, is even less formal or serious. Written entirely by hand, information technology says, "I look forrad to seeing you lot next week. It will be great. Best wishes."

The second summit turned out to be anything but "cracking." It was a failure with long-lasting consequences, though the U.S. side did not realize at the fourth dimension how badly Kim would react. Trump did what he could before leaving Hanoi to assure Kim that the breakdown was only temporary and that they could come across again. In a concluding-minute movement, Kim sent out a senior foreign ministry official to clarify his offer to close down Yongbyon—that he meant the entire complex, not just part of information technology. It'southward not clear whether the clarification would take helped. Information technology was too late—Trump's motorcade was already getting fix to get out.

Trump shakes hands with Kim following a meeting at the Sofitel Legend Metropole hotel in Hanoi on Feb. 27, 2019. SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images

The adjacent letter in the exchange comes from Trump on March 22, ostensibly on occasion of the "upcoming anniversary" of the nativity of Kim's grandfather, Kim Il Sung, the founder of the Due north Korean dynasty. "Upcoming" may take been seen by Kim equally a stretch, since the April 15 altogether—commemorated as the Day of the Sunday in Northward Korea—was still more than three weeks abroad. Trump writes that Kim has "carried forrad" his gramps's vision and now has a "historic opportunity to fulfill [Kim Il Sung's] dying wish—to achieve denuclearization." That would likely have been read in Pyongyang as a crude attempt to get Kim dorsum into the game by appealing to a presumed emotional bond to the sacred past. In a spoken language on April 12, Kim confirmed the breakdown of talks in Hanoi and gave a gloomy view of what the future would hold without a significant change in the U.S. approach. Although Kim'due south remarks made articulate that Trump'southward latest try to restart the conversation went nowhere, the N Korean leader added: "Merely as President Trump keeps saying, the personal ties between me and him are not hostile like the relations betwixt the 2 countries, and we nonetheless maintain splendid relations, as to be able to exchange letters asking nearly health someday if we want."

It probably hadn't helped that in his March letter, Trump had devolved into what the Northward Koreans must have seen as tissue-sparse psychological warfare—or a cheap negotiating ploy out of The Fine art of the Bargain: "[Y]ou are my friend and always volition exist. Contrary to some media reports about our meeting, you and I take fabricated tremendous progress." If Kim didn't express joy out loud at that line, and then surely he was slack-jawed. "Although there is even so a lot of work to do," Trump continues, "I accept great hope and expectation about what you and I tin accomplish … if nosotros remain committed to our shared goals." Anyone in Pyongyang grasping at straws might take latched on to "our shared goals," but they had all been burned by the previous exchange. In the sour mood following Hanoi, the optimists—if they existed—probably didn't behave much weight.

Through May and early June, there were signs—typically obscure—in the North Korean media of a vigorous policy discussion, suggesting that the temper might exist slowly improving for another run at engaging Washington. On June 10, Kim used the excuse of the 1-year ceremony of the Singapore summit on June 12 and Trump'due south birthday on June xiv to send his first letter in five months. Trump would draw the letter to the media as "beautiful." Much of the U.Southward. media covering the commutation was by now in a fully cynical mode and suggested that the bulletin had no substance. To the opposite, it was another important letter. Kim writes: "Today'south reality is that without a new approach and the courage information technology takes, the prospects for resolution of the issue will only exist bleak." Although its substance seems negative, that formulation is essentially a come-here signal with its reference to the possibility of a "new approach." Kim ends his letter of the alphabet: "I believe the one mean solar day will come up sooner or later when we sit downwards together to brand bully things happen, with the will to give another chance to our common trust." Although non an explicit invitation to another coming together, this expression of hope meant that the door was cracking open up over again.

Trump answered Kim quickly and positively on June 12, finally—for the very first fourth dimension—acknowledging the U.Due south. commitments made in Singapore: "[Y]ou committed to completely denuclearize, and I committed to provide security guarantees. We both committed to plant new relations for our 2 countries and to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." At last we are getting somewhere, they may accept murmured in Pyongyang. The North Korean media quoted Kim as saying Trump'due south letter was "excellent."

Ii weeks later, Trump invited Kim to meet in the Demilitarized Zone along the heavily fortified inter-Korean border with "no special agenda," and Kim apace accepted. The two leaders met on June 30, marking the first time a sitting U.S. president stepped on Due north Korean soil. "I never expected to see you in this place," Kim told Trump in Korean. Among other things, the ii sides agreed to convene expert working groups to movement things forward. But whatever may have been possible to accomplish every bit a outcome of this meeting proved impossible to sustain. A calendar month later, on Aug. five, in an unusually long alphabetic character of unrelenting woe, Kim laid out his concerns. He begins the missive by noting that he "remember[southward] clearly" the promise he made to Trump for experts to resolve the outstanding issues. However, he says, "the current surroundings is dissimilar from that twenty-four hours."

Kim and Trump see within the Demilitarized Zone separating S and North Korea in Panmunjom on June thirty, 2019. Dong-A Ilbo via Getty Images/Getty Images

The problem, Kim writes, is the almanac U.Due south.-South Korean joint war machine exercises that had been held in the wake of the summit. These "provocative combined military exercises" had taken place despite Kim's belief that they "would either exist canceled or postponed" ahead of "working-level negotiations where we would continue to discuss important matters." Kim and then asks, rhetorically, "Confronting whom [are] the combined military exercises taking identify in the southern role of the Korean Peninsula, who are they trying to block, and who are they intended to defeat and attack?" He answers his own question: "Conceptually and hypothetically, the chief target of the war preparatory exercises is our own armed forces. This is not our misunderstanding."

Kim continues: "I do not understand the purpose of having these 'war games' that nosotros consider as threatening at the time when we are looking ahead [to] this very important meeting. At present, it is very difficult for me and my people to understand your side's and the S Korean authority's decisions and actions. The near important cause of what your side considers the headache of 'missile threats' and nuclear trouble is the military actions of your side and the South Korean military that threatens our condom. And until these elements are eliminated, no changed outcome can be predictable.

"I am clearly offended, and I do not want to hibernate this feeling from y'all. I am actually, very offended. At every opportunity after we met, you said there are no more than artificial earthquakes [i.due east., nuclear tests] and no objects flying in the sky [i.e., no missile tests]."

Kim continues: "In this vein, I take done more than than I can at this nowadays stage, very responsively and practically, in social club to keep the trust we have. However, what has Your Excellency done, and what am I to explicate to my people nearly what has changed since nosotros met? Take actions been relaxed or whatsoever [of] my land'due south external environments been improved? Have military exercises been stopped?"

"I practise non wish to practise anything to disappoint y'all anytime soon, nor do I plan to practise so," he adds. And then, in about as baldheaded a statement from the North Korean leader as one could imagine, Kim writes: "If you exercise not think of our relationship as a stepping stone that merely benefits you, and so you would not brand me look like an idiot that will only requite without getting anything in return.

"My letter has gone long, but to state my main point, regrettably now is not the time to engage in working-level talks. Information technology is not the correct atmosphere in my country, and if we were to movement forward with working-level talks now, our leadership would be viewed as strange by the exterior world and by us too." In whatever case, "What kind of working-level talks could we possibly have? It obviously would not be well-nigh the sanctions relief, which I very much wanted, nor will it exist virtually the location of our quaternary top talks."

Finally, Kim gets to his bottom line: "To put it another style, we are not in a hurry. If this were like Hanoi, just a few months agone, when I held on to the dream of hastening the start of a improve life, information technology would be different. Simply nosotros are in a different state of affairs, and we are not in a hurry."

Later on this long complaining from Kim, the correspondence betwixt the two leaders appears to have concluded.

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Source: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/13/north-korea-trump-kim-jong-un-love-letters-diplomacy-nuclear-talks/

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